I. INTRODUCTION
In its 1985 Term, the United States Supreme Court established a new test to determine the validity of a defendant's waiver of his sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel.' In Michigan v. Jackson, 2 the Court, relying on Edwards v. Arizona, 3 held that when a defendant asserts his right to counsel at an arraignment or similar proceeding, any subsequent waiver of this right during police interrogation must be preceded by communication initiated by the defendant. 4 In applying the Edwards rule to sixth amendment waivers, the Court strengthened the sixth amendment waiver standard for defendants who have requested counsel. The sixth amendment guarantee, unlike its fifth amendment counterpart, does not hinge on such a request, however. As a result, the Court's holding leaves several issues unsettled. The Court, by limiting the application ofJackson to those defendants who request counsel, must still determine what protections are due to those who do not request a lawyer. Further, the Court must clearly define "initiation" in the sixth amendment context. 5 After reviewing Jackson, this Note explores the history of the sixth amendment right, comparing it to the development of the fifth fendant Jackson. 15 Jackson was arrested and arraigned as one of four participants in a woman's plan to kill her husband. 16 During arraignment, Jackson, like Bladel, requested the assistance of counsel, but before meeting with counsel, two police officers re-questioned him 17 to "confirm" his involvement in the murder.' 8 The officers informed Jackson of his Miranda rights, and he agreed to the questioning in the absence of counsel.' 9 The trial court admitted Jackson's postarraignment confession into evidence and convicted him of seconddegree murder. 20 The Court of Appeals upheld the conviction and held that the statements were properly admitted. 2 1 The Michigan Supreme Court granted leave to appeal. 22 The Michigan Supreme Court held that the post-arraignment confessions should have been excluded because they were obtained in the absence of counsel and violated both defendants' sixth amendment rights. 23 The court also held that the Edwards rule for fifth amendment waivers during custodial interrogation 24 applied by analogy when an accused requests counsel before the arraigning magistrate. 25 Therefore, if an accused requests counsel at arraignment, police may not interrogate him further unless the accused initiates communication with the police and then makes a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of both his fifth and sixth amendment rights. had a right to counsel at the post-arraignment interrogations, but whether they had validly waived their rights. The State first contended that Edwards should not be extended to the sixth amendment because of legal differences between the fifth and sixth amendment rights to counsel. 32 Justice Stevens found these differences irrelevant since "the reasons for prohibiting the interrogation of an uncounseled prisoner who has asked for the help of a lawyer are even stronger after he has been formally charged with an offense than before." 3 3 The initiation of adversary judicial proceedings, and the concurrent attachment of the sixth amendment right to counsel, indicates that the adverse positions of the defendant and the government have solidified. 3 4 Further, once 27 Michigan v.Jackson, 106 S. Ct. 1404, 1407-08 (1986). The court realized that this right to counsel derived from both the fifth and sixth amendments. Id. The fifth amendment right to counsel, designed to protect against compelled self-incrimination, attaches when an accused requests counsel at a "custodial interrogation. " 
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[Vol. 77 the defendant has been formally charged, he faces "the prosecutorial forces of organized society." 3 5 Since the "suspect" has now become an "accused" and is protected by the sixth amendment, police must refrain from using various investigatory techniques, such as electronic surveillance, that they could have used prior to arraignment. 3 6 The majority concluded that the protections afforded by the sixth amendment are at least as important as those guaranteed by the fifth amendment, making any legal difference between the two unimportant.
3 7
Justice Stevens also rejected the state's argument that factual differences between a request at a custodial interrogation and at an arraignment indicate that the Edwards rule should not be extended. 3 8 He noted that an accused who makes a request at the arraignment desires a lawyer's aid, not only at formal legal proceedings, but at all confrontations between the state and the accused. 3 9 The Court, therefore, refused to view each request narrowly, since most defendants are unaware of the differences between their fifth and sixth amendment rights. 40 Justice Stevens, however, noted that the sixth amendment right to counsel does not hinge on a request for counsel, but is simply viewed "as an extremely important fact in considering the validity of a subsequent waiver in response to police-initiated interrogation.
The State also emphasized another factual difference: while police obviously know of a request for counsel made during custodial interrogations, they might not be aware of a similar request made at arraignment. 4 2 Thus, the State claimed, the Edwards rule would not work in the sixth amendment context. Justice Stevens disagreed because the sixth amendment "concerns the confrontation between the State and the individual," thereby imputing knowledge of a request made at arraignment to the police. 4 3 Further, Edwards created a simple, "bright-line" rule, and adopting it for sixth amendment 35 Id at 1408 (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984) ). The Court has commonly used this phrase to indicate that the sixth amendment right has attached and to emphasize the importance of that right in providing a guarantee to a fair trial.
3 6 Jackson, 106 S. Ct. at 1409. (1984) ). 41 Id. at 1409 n.6. 42 Id. at 1410. 43 Id.
1986]
waivers would not lead to confusion. 4 4 Finally, Justice Stevens refuted the State's contention that the defendants in Jackson had validly waived their rights. Instead, the Court decided to extend Edwards to the sixth amendment. 4 5 Thus, the Court held that when a request for counsel is made at an arraignment or similar proceeding, police may not begin any interrogation without counsel unless the accused first initiates the communication and then knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waives his rights. 46 Applying this new rule to the facts, Justice Stevens found that the written waivers given in response to police-initiated interrogation were insufficient to establish a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver. THE DISSENT Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Powell and O'Connor joined. Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the majority's reasoning that because sixth amendment rights are more important than fifth amendment rights, the rule of Edwards should apply to the sixth amendment. 5 1 He contended that the purpose of Edwards and the fifth amendment right to counsel is to prevent the police from "badgering" a suspect into waiving his rights and involuntarily incriminating himself. 5 2 Thus, Justice Rehnquist felt that the question in Jackson was not whether the sixth amendment right is more important than its fifth amendment counterpart, but whether 44 Id. 45 Id. at 1411. 46 Id. Thus, this waiver rule is the same rule as that adopted in Edwards. 47 Id. at 1410, 1411. 48 Id. at 1411 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 49 Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring). ChiefJustice Burger did not state which prophylactic rules to which he referred. 
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the prophylactic reasons for creating the Edwards rule are present in the sixth amendment context. 53 Answering this question in the negative, he concluded that the Court should not have extended Edwards to the sixth amendment.
4
He also argued that the majority, without explaining its decision, limited the "rule to those defendants foresighted enough or just plain lucky enough, to have made an explicit request for counsel which we have always understood to be completely unnecessary for Sixth Amendment purposes." 5 5 The majority's decision to limit Jackson to those who request counsel left the Court in "an analytical strait-jacket." ' 5 6 Because the sixth amendment serves different purposes than the fifth amendment, Justice Rehnquist would not have applied the "bright-line" rule of Edwards to sixth amendment waiver cases.
57

IV. ANALYSIS
In Jackson, the Court developed an important new standard of pre-trial waiver for the sixth amendment right to counsel. Once a defendant requests counsel, the police may not interrogate him in the absence of counsel unless he initiates communication with the police and then waives his right to counsel. 58 Since the application of the Jackson rule is limited to situations where a defendant requests counsel, however, the Court must still clarify the waiver standard where no such request is made. Further, it is not certain whether the post-Edwards ruling defining "initiation," i.e., Oregon v. Bradshaw, 5 9 will also apply in the sixth amendment context. As an aid to understandingJackson, this analysis includes a review of the fifth and sixth amendments rights to counsel, a discussion of the development of the sixth amendment waiver doctrine, and an analysis of the shortcomings of the Jackson rule with suggested solutions to unresolved questions.
A. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Court has held that both the fifth and sixth amendments 
S. 1039 (1983).
In Bradshaw, the Court held that an accused iniates communication with the police when he "evince[s] a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation" and is not merely making a "necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship." Id. at 1045-46. guarantee the right to counsel. Although the explicit language of the fifth amendment does not provide for the right to counsel, 60 the Court, in Miranda v. Arizona, held that such a right was necessary to protect an accused's fifth amendment guarantee against compelled self-incrimination during custodial interrogation. 6 1 Custodial interrogation is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 6 2
The Court strengthened Miranda in Edwards by creating a strict prophylactic rule. The Court held that once an accused has expressed a desire to deal with the police only through counsel, the police may not conduct further interrogation in the absence of counsel until the accused "intiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police," 63 and then validly waives his counsel rights. 64 The Court later defined interrogation as "express questioning" or words or actions by the police that "are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." 65 Edwards sets forth a "bright-line" rule, in the absence of which "the authorities through 'badger[ing]' or 'overreaching'-explicit or subtle, deliberate or unintentional-might otherwise wear down an accused and pursuade him to incriminate himself notwithstanding his earlier request for counsel's assistance." '6 6 B.
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The language of the sixth amendment, in contrast to the fifth amendment, explicitly provides for the right to counsel, but limits that right to assistance during "criminal prosecutions." 6 7 This right 60 The fifth amendment provides: No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service or time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. is "indispensable to the fair administration of our adversarial system of criminal justice," 68 because it ensures that the accused is provided with a spokesman or advisor 6 9 who is familiar with the "intricacies of the law." ' 70 Therefore, it serves different, and perhaps more important, purposes than the fifth amendment right. In Powell v. Alabama, 71 the Court hinted that to ensure the effectiveness of the sixth amendment and to guarantee due process, the right to counsel should include representation at pre-trial proceedings. 72 The Court, in United States v. Ash, 73 found that this right extended back to "critical stages" of the proceedings 74 because the guarantee of" 'Assistance' would be less than meaningful if it were limited to the formal trial itself." ' (1932) . In Powell, the defendants' trials began six days after arraignment but counsel were not appointed until the morning of the trials. The Court found that "during perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings against these defendants .. .when consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation were vitally important, the defendants did not have the aid of counsel in any real sense. On the other hand, in Gilbert, the Court also held that the uncounseled, pre-indictment taking of handwriting exemplars was not a critical stage of the proceedings because there was only a "minimal risk" of violating the right to a fair trial. Id. at 267. The Court distinguished handwriting samples from line-ups by stating that, unlike identifications made at pretrial line-ups, the defendant "has the opportunity for a meaningful confrontation of the [State's] case at trial" by presenting, for example, his own handwriting experts. Id. In other words, since any evidence of guilt found in handwriting samples can easily be refuted at trial while line-up identifications cannot, the Court found that the protections of the sixth amendment were only necessary for the latter. (1984) , the Court held that administrative segregation of prisoners suspected of murders did not trigger the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings, indicating that the sixth amendment right had yet to attach. The Court also found that adversary judicial proceedings had not begun in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 n.4 (1980), where a post-arrest discussion between police officers resulting in an uncounseled confesssion did not implicate the prisoner's sixth amendment rights. On the other hand, the Court found that these proceedings had begun in United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 269 (1980) , where the post-indictment use of a jailhouse informant violated the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel. amendmend right to counsel is the vital issue. 8 4 WhileJackson falls into this second category, a brief review of both categories is necessary to fully understand the new waiver rule.
Deliberate Elicitation
In Massiah v. United States, 8 5 the Court held that incriminating information "deliberately elicited" from the defendant in the absence of counsel must be excluded from evidence. 8 6 In Massiah, a co-defendant, acting as a undercover agent, arranged a meeting in his car with the defendant. 8 7 Unbeknownst to the defendant, the police had equipped the car with microphones. 88 Thus, the police were able to overhear the pair's conversation during which the defendant made incriminating statements. 89 Relying on his concurring opinion in Spano v. New York, 90 Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, concluded that allowing police to surreptitiously obtain incriminating information from the defendant in this manner undermined the purpose of the sixth amendment guarantee. 9 1 The sixth amendment prohibits such deliberate elicitation of a defendant's statements.
The Massiah analysis remained dormant for many years 9 2 until the Court returned to the deliberate elicitation standard in United States v. Henry. 93 In Henry, the government placed an informant in the defendant's cell to obtain incriminating information. 94 and thus, did not know to whom they were speaking. Massiah and its progeny are important because they indicate that once the sixth amendment attaches, the police, whether through coercive or noncoercive means, may not attempt to subvert in any manner a defendant's right to have counsel act as a "medium"' 1 0 0 between him and the state.'1 0 While a violation of the fifth amendment right to counsel depends on the coerciveness of the state's actions, the sixth amendment's prohibition of deliberate elicitation indicates that the sixth amendment has a lower threshold for violation, and is at least as important as, if not more important than, the fifth amendment right.
Waiver of the Sixth Amendment Right
Realizing that the sixth amendment needed a waiver standard as strong as its fifth amendment counterpart, the Jackson majority extended the fifth amendment Edwards waiver rule to the sixth amendment. 0 2 There are two basic situations in which sixth amendment waiver is an issue: (1) when a defendant desires to proceed at trial pro se, and (2) [Vol. 77
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relinquishment of a constitutional right. 10 4 Further, the Court stated that "the determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience and conduct of the accused."' 0 5 According to Zerbst, therefore, waiver of the sixth amendment right to counsel consists of two distinct elements: 1) comprehension of the right to counsel and 2) affirmative relinquishment of that right. 106 Applying the Zerbst waiver standard in Faretta v. California,' 0 7 the Court determined that a defendant could waive his right to counsel in order to proceedpro se at trial.1 0 8 In Faretta, the Court focused on the "comprehension" element of the Zerbst standard.' 09 The Court held that for a defendant to represent himself at trial, "he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation so that the record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.' "110 Further, the defendant has the burden of showing that he understands the right he is relinquishing."'1 Thus, the Court has developed a clear and fairly stringent comprehension standard for those who desire to proceedpro se.
The Court, however, has not looked at a defendant's comprehension of his right when the state attempts to show waiver during police interrogation. Instead, the Court has focused on the second prong of the Zerbst standard, "relinquishment.""1 2 When a defendant attempts to proceed pro se he clearly desires to relinquish his sixth amendment right. Relinquishment, on the other hand, is not as obvious when the police attempt to admit non-counseled confessions or other incriminating statements into evidence. The Court confronted such a situation in Brewer v. Williams.1
13
In Williams, the defendant, a religious man, was accused of killing a young girl. Although the police promised Williams' lawyers became more evident after Edwards enunciated a straightforward rule for fifth amendment waivers.' 22 In Williams, the defendant's comprehension of his right to counsel was never questioned by the Court, 2 3 which instead focused on the relinquishment prong of the waiver standard.' 24 Similarly, the Jackson Court, apparently assuming that the defendants understood "the dangers and disadvantages"' ' 25 of speaking to the police without counsel, focused on relinquishment. 26 Although it is highly unlikely the defendants in Jackson understood their rights in the Faretta sense, the Court's extension of Edwards to the sixth amendment provides clearer guidelines by which to judge a defendant's purported waiver during police interrogation. By holding that once asserted the right to counsel cannot be waived, unless the defendant initiates communication with the police, the Court has created a clear, precise, prophylactic rule which not only' protects defendants' rights but is easily construable by both courts and the police.' 2 7
Nonetheless, the Court, by emphasizing the defendant's request for counsel, 28 unnecessarly limits the application of its improved sixth amendment waiver standard. Hinging the application of Edwards on a request for counsel is logical in the fifth amendment context, because such a request is needed to invoke the fifth amendment right to counsel. 129 No request is needed, however, to invoke the sixth amendment right 3 0 which automatically attaches at the the same protections as one who does. Emphasizing the request is not equivalent to abandoning the basic tenet that a request is not needed to invoke the sixth amendment right. Hence, at a minimum, the Court should construct protections for these defendants with a relinquishment standard equivalent to those in Jackson. The confrontation between the state and the defendant is no less critical because of a failure to request counsel.
To shore up this weakness, the Court has three apparent options. First, the Court could find that signed waivers given after Miranda-type warnings are sufficient for a valid waiver. Second, the Court could create a stricter standard than Jackson, holding that the right to counsel can only be waived in front of a neutral judicial officer. Finally, the Court could exclude all statements given in response to police-initiated interrogations regardless of whether a request has been made or not.
Prior to Jackson, several circuits adopted, in various forms, the first option: requiring only a signed waiver in response to Mirandatype warnings.' 3 8 While there may be some administrative advantages to this approach, because it permits police to proceed with interrogation with minimal delays, adopting the fifth amendment standard ignores the greater importance of the sixth amendment right.' 3 9 Further, such warnings fall significantly short of satisfying the Faretta comprehension standard by failing to guarantee that the defendant fully understands the dangers and disadvantages of relinquishment. An additional reason to adopt a more stringent standard than the fifth amendment rule is that once the sixth amendment attaches, the government supposedly has "legally sufficient evidence of the defendant's guilt."' 40 Therefore, a waiver given in response to Miranda warnings is neither of great use to the government, nor does it properly protect a defendant's sixth amendment rights.
The second option, validating a waiver only in the presence of a neutral judicial officer, would provide greater protection for an accused who does not request counsel than for one who makes such a request. Therefore, such a rule would be inconsistent with Jackson's mandate of emphasizing the request. This standard, adopted by the second circuit prior to Jackson in United States v. Mohabir, 14 1 would ensure that the Faretta comprehension standard is met before finding a waiver. A major drawback to this approach, though, is that it would increase delays in prosecution. In light of Jackson, where the Court chose to emphasize relinquishment rather than comprehension at the pre-trial stage, adopting this standard for one who does not request counsel would be illogical and inconsistent.
The final option, adopting the Jackson rule in all sixth amendment situations regardless of whether or not the defendant has requested counsel, would enable the Court to logically extricate itself from its self-imposed "strait-jacket." This standard would provide all defendants with equivalent sixth amendment protections and would be stricter than the Edwards standard because no request would be needed to invoke the rule. The Court could still maintain its emphasis on the request by ruling that a request would make it more difficult to find a subsequent waiver after defendant-intitated communication. This rule would also be in line with the no-request doctrine of the sixth amendment. Further, a single standard for every sixth amendment case would provide a clear, simple and easily applicable rule to both the police and the courts because all defendants, regardless of whether they requested counsel, would be treated similarly.
One failure of this option, and perhaps the major weakness of Jackson, is that by placing such a great emphasis on relinquishment, it tends to ignore the comprehension issue during police interrogation. The Court has not yet reconciled its seemingly different views on comprehension in pre-trial waivers given during police interrogation and in pro se waivers like that in Faretta.' 42 It is unclear why 141 624 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1980). 142 In Jackson, the Court only discussed comprehension in the context of the defendants' invocation of his right to counsel, not waiver. Jackson, 106 S. Ct. at 1409, 1410 n.7 ("When an accused requests an attorney before a police officer or a magistrate, he does not know what constitutional right he is invoking."). In Wifiams, the issue is barely discussed at all. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977)("It is true that Williams had been informed of and appeared to understand his right to counsel.").
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[Vol. 77 one who desires to be his own counsel at trial has a greater burden to show comprehension than do the police who are trying to validate a waiver so that they can admit incriminating evidence. The Court's emphasis on relinquishment by creating a tough, per se standard in Jackson, though, may have obviated the need to consider comprehension at all in these situations. Regardless, in light ofJackson, the Court should eliminate the request requirement so that all defendants' sixth amendment rights are protected equally.
Definition of Initiation
The Court must also determine whether its ruling in Oregon v. Bradshaw,1 4 3 defining initiation under Edwards, will also apply to Jackson. In Bradshaw, the Court held that the accused had initiated communication with the police when, after requesting counsel and invoking Edwards, he asked the police "'Well, what is going to happen to me now?' "144 The Court found this simple question satisfied the first prong of Edwards because it "evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation; it was not merely a necessary inquiry arising out of incidents of the custodial relationship."
Justice Marshall in dissent felt that this bare inquiry alone did not meet the first prong, stating instead that the Edwards Court meant to define initiation to include only invitations to further interrogation by the police in the absence of counsel. 4 6 Such an invitation can only be found when an accused "reopens the dialogue about the subject matter of the criminal investigation." 147 Injustice Marshall's view, the accused's question in Bradshaw only evinced a desire to find out where he was being taken and did not relate to the criminal investigation. 148 The definition of intitiation is crucial to the strength of the waiver standard. A low threshold, like Bradshaw, will undercut the effectiveness ofJackson by providing little protection for the unwary prisoner. For example, lower courts, in applying the Bradshaw standard, have sometimes glossed over the requirement of intitiation to find a valid waiver. 1 49 On the other hand, a strict definition of intia-143 462 U.S. 1039 (1983). See supra note 59. 144 Id. at 1042. 145 Id. at 1045-1046. 146 Id. at 1053 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 147 Id. at 1054 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 148 Id. at 1055 (Marshall, J., dissenting). tion, such as that proposed by Justice Marshall, will enhance a defendant's right and make it more difficult to find a waiver. The question arises then, whether, in light of the heightened importance of the sixth amendment, as opposed to the fifth amendment the Court should adopt a stricter rule to apply in Jackson situations.
The Court should adoptJustice Marshall's definition to provide greater protection for the more important sixth amendment right. The major drawback to this approach is that it might create confusion for both lower courts and police because it involves the use of two different standards in somewhat similar situations. Because the Court should make its rules as simple and clear as possible, multiple standards will only make it more difficult for police to know the constitutional limits for each type of interrogation. Nonetheless, because a fair trial depends on the sixth amendment right to counsel and because the police must respect that right, 1 50 the benefits of a stricter sixth amendment initiation definition outweigh any potential burdens.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court in Jackson developed a strong sixth amendment waiver standard but limited its applicability to those defendants who make a request for counsel. The per se rule taken from Edwards, ordering the police to halt interrogation once counsel is requested, should prevent future violations of the sixth amendment rights of defendants who request counsel. The Court's reliance on the request for counsel as the critical factor in determining waivers, however, is misplaced in the sixth amendment context. As a result, the Court should extend the Jackson rule to those defendants who fail to request counsel. The Court must also clearly define "initiation" for the sixth amendment rule, preferably adopting Justice Marshall's standard in Oregon v. Bradshaw. Jackson indicates that the Court, when judging waiver during custodial interrogation, will continue to rely solely on a determination of whether a defendant has relinquished his sixth amendment right and will continue to ignore the question of whether a defendant in a custodial environment truly comprehends the right he is waiving. Hence, the Court must confront the two unresolved issues beforeJackson's per se rule will effectively protect all defendants' right to counsel.
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